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Abstract 
Following from the Scottish Law Commission’s Report on Insanity and Diminished 
Responsibility, the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 codified the plea of 
diminished responsibility. Part of the justification for this codification arose from the need to 
clarify the rule in relation to drugs and alcohol. With this change there existed scope to 
develop the plea in a way which appreciated the complex interplay between mental 
conditions and intoxication- something which was absent under common law. At a time when 
mental health law is under review in Scotland, this article seeks to examine the landscape of 
diminished responsibility, asking whether s51B is able to properly appreciate the realities of 
offending and whether it is applied to all accused fairly and consistently. 
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This article maps the landscape of diminished responsibility in Scotland following 
codification of the plea. It focuses particularly on how the interaction between mental 
abnormality and voluntary intoxication has been understood. In addition to considering recent 
decisions by the Scottish appeal court, this article presents analysis from 29 unreported cases 
in which diminished responsibility was pled.  
The examination which will follow is timely: an independent review of mental health 
law is currently being undertaken, questioning whether current mental health law promotes 
and protects human rights in Scotland.1 Concerns relating to access to diminished 
responsibility do not simply centre around appropriate convictions: the plea can and does act 
as an appropriate gateway to mental health care and treatment for those in need. 
It will be concluded that the appeal court has adopted a narrow interpretation in relation 
to the interaction between mental abnormality and voluntary intoxication. This not only 
 
1 Scottish Government, Overview of the Review of Mental Health Law in Scotland, available 
at https://consult.gov.scot/mental-health-law-secretariat/review-of-mental-health-law-in-
scotland/  
undermines the justifications which were made for placing diminished responsibility in 
statutory form, it moves the plea towards a position of being unable to appreciate the realities 
of mental health conditions and circumstances in which people offend. It will be shown that 
tensions exist between the appeal court’s approach and the operation of the plea in practice, 
and that whilst operation in practice might offer more opportunity for access to the defence, it 
may also be perpetuating gender stereotypes about female offending. 
 
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A STATUTORY PLEA 
 
(1) Common law development 
Described as “distinctively Scottish.”2, diminished responsibility developed throughout early 
20th caselaw - even if not always referred to by the same terminology.3 This development 
influenced legislation in other jurisdictions- notably England and Wales where it was 
introduced through the Homicide Act 1957 (although as Loughnan notes, the focus of 
attention at that time was on capital punishment rather than diminished responsibility).4  
Historically, the plea required that a mental disease or a state of mind virtually bordering 
on insanity be shown.5 Modern formulation arose from Galbraith6 where it was accepted that 
the earlier authority of Savage7 had been misinterpreted in Connelly .8 In particular, 
misunderstanding had arisen regarding the requirement that the accused be suffering from a 
‘mental disease’ and was required to satisfy the four criteria set out in Savage.9 Agreeing this 
point on appeal, it was clarified that: there must be an abnormality of mind and that this 
abnormality substantially impaired the accused’s ability to control their conduct; that a 
mental disease was not required to satisfy the plea and that the criteria in Savage did not need 
to be adhered to absolutely- instead only being an indication of what an accused would need 
to prove.  
 
2 J Chalmers and F Leverick, Criminal Defences and Pleas in Bar of Trial (2006) para 11-01. 
3 Ibid. 
4 A Loughnan, Manifest Madness (2012) 233. 
5 HM Advocate v Savage 1923 JC 49. 
6 Galbraith v HM Advocate (No 2) 2002 JC 1. 
7 HM Advocate v Savage 1923 JC49.  
8 Connelly v HM Advocate 1990 JC 349.  
9 An aberration or weakness if mind; a state of mind bordering on but not amounting to 
insanity; mental unsoundness; and a mind so affected that criminal responsibility can only be 
partial. 
 
(1) Reviews of the law in this area 
Shortly before the decision in Galbraith, the Millan Committee published their Review of the 
Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984, recommending amongst other things that the Scottish 
Law Commission be invited to review the defence of diminished responsibility.10They noted 
that, in practice, the definition of diminished responsibility was “obscure, and difficult to 
apply in individual cases”.11 Thereafter, the Scottish Law Commission received instruction 
from Scottish Ministers that there existed a remit for them to consider: 
1. The tests to establish insanity (either as a defence or as a plea in bar of trial) and the 
plea of diminished responsibility  
2. Issues of the law of evidence and procedure involved in raising and establishing 
insanity and diminished responsibility 
3. Recommendations for reform; and  
4. Consequent upon any recommendations for reform, to consider what changes, if any, 
should be made to the powers of the courts to deal with persons in respect of whom 
insanity (either as a defence or as a plea in bar of trial) or diminished responsibility 
has been established.12 
In the report which followed, the Scottish Law Commission proposed abolishing the common 
law test for diminished responsibility and introducing a statutory definition.13 In support of 
codification, they referred to the recent decision of Galbraith: 
We note that the decision in the Galbraith case did not purport to deal with every issue 
involved with the plea. In Galbraith the Court itself stated that its views were tentative 
and might have to be modified or refined in later cases. We accept that the general 
positive criteria for the plea as laid down in that decision have met with general 
approval. However the new test also excludes two specific conditions (voluntary 
intoxication and psychopathic personality disorder) from the scope of the plea, and 
these exclusions have been controversial. Indeed, the response to our proposals on the 
exclusions has led us to recommend that the law in relation to them should be 
 
10 Millan Committee, Review of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 (2001), 
Recommendation 29.6, 358. 
11 Ibid at 357. 
12 Scottish Parliament, Criminal Justice and Licensing Scotland Bill, Policy Memorandum 
(2009) 77. 
13 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Insanity and Diminished Responsibility (2004) 32. 
clarified or altered. But it would be an undesirable approach to law reform to change 
part of the Galbraith test by statute while leaving the rest in its common law form. 
Moreover, as one of our consultees pointed out, the limits to the scope of the plea 
involve considerations of public policy, which are best addressed by the legislature.14 
The Scottish Law Commission further noted that other legal systems which had introduced a 
plea of diminished responsibility had done so by statute and that a “statutory definition does 
not prevent judicial activism and creativity where that is required for legal development”.15 
 
(2) The introductory of a statutory definition 
The statutory definition of diminished responsibility was subsequently introduced into Scots 
law following the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (which inserted section 
51B into the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995):  
A person who would otherwise be convicted of murder is instead to be convicted of 
culpable homicide on the grounds of diminished  responsibility if the person’s 
ability to determine or control conduct for which the person would otherwise be 
convicted of murder was, at the time of the conduct, substantially impaired by reason 
of abnormality of mind. 
The wording of section 51B (1) confirmed that diminished responsibility would have no 
application in the context of attempted murder- referring to ‘murder’ only. The position in 
relation to attempted murder had been less clear under common law. In Blake it was 
commented:  
The state of mind of the accused may be such, short of insanity, as to reduce the quality of 
his act from attempted murder to assault. A man may suffer from some infirmity or 
aberration of mind or impairment of the intellect to such an extent as to render him not 
fully accountable in law for his actions. Such a man is described as being a man of 
diminished responsibility. If he has not been fully responsible for what he has done, he is 
guilty not of attempted murder but of assault. 16 
 
14 Ibid at 31-32. 
15 Scottish Law Commission (n 13) 32. 
16 HM Advocate v Blake 1986 SLT 661. 
Shortly before the enactment of the 2010 Act, the Crown appeal of Kerr considered the issue 
again, concluding: 
We accept the submission on behalf of the respondent that the actus reus of murder and 
attempted murder differs in the sense that in the completed crime of murder the 
consequence is the death of the victim whereas that is not achieved in the attempted 
crime. However, it is clear that the mens rea for the crime of murder and attempted 
murder is identical. 17 
The court reserved its opinion in relation to the effect of the statutory provisions which were 
not yet in force18, noting that neither the Scottish Law Commission’s Report on Insanity and 
Diminished Responsibility, the statutory provisions contained within the 2010 Act, nor 
English law (where it is not accepted as a defence to attempted murder) were of any 
assistance when considering the question.19 The Scottish Law Commission’s report itself was 
clear that the plea of diminished responsibility should not be extended beyond murder20, but 
the discussion in Kerr illustrates that there is logic to concluding that evidence of diminished 
responsibility should give rise to an assault or aggravated assault conviction in the context of 
an attempted murder charge since the mens rea required for murder and attempted murder is 
identical.21 Nevertheless, this was not the position adopted by the 2010 Act. 
 
C. POST CODIFICATION CASES 
 
The 2010 Act came into force in 2012. Since then, four appeal cases have been reported in 
which diminished responsibility has been the central issue. Three of these cases have been 
remitted to the appeal court by the Scottish Criminal Case Review Commission, further 
suggesting that closer examination of diminished responsibility cases post codification is 
 
17 HM Advocate v Kerr 2011 SLT 430 at para 7. 
18 Ibid at para 5. 
19 HM Advocate v Kerr 2011 SLT 430 at para 9. 
20 Scottish Law Commission (n 13) 44. 
21 Cawthorne v HM Advocate 1968 JC 32. 
appropriate.22 Three additional sentencing appeals have been reported since 2012 in which 
the appellant had submitted a plea of diminished responsibility.23 
In addition, 29 unreported cases have been identified in which an accused sought to 
rely on diminished responsibility. These cases relate to homicides occurring between 2012 
and 2019 and were identified as part of a larger ongoing study on Scottish homicide cases 
being carried out by the author. Sentencing statements were available for nine of these 29 
cases.  
Diminished responsibility was accepted in 18 of the 29 unreported cases identified 
(62.1%).24 In nine of these 18 cases where diminished responsibility was accepted, medical 
disposals were sanctioned by the court (52.6%). In seven of these nine cases, the disposal was 
detention at the state hospital, suggesting that the mental abnormality in question was severe. 
Amongst the unreported cases in which diminished responsibility was accepted but 
medical disposals were not ordered, the length of prison sentences ranged from three years 
and seven months to 16 years. Two offenders received deferred sentences. 
By way of context, between 2012/13 and 2018/19, the total number of people who 
had proceedings brought against them for homicide was 790.25 This would suggest that a 
relatively small percentage of those accused of homicide in Scotland seek to rely on 
diminished responsibility. Despite this, and the fact that an analysis of unreported cases 
suggests a high success rate with the plea, it remains important to examine the landscape of 
diminished responsibility post codification. 
 
D. BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF 
(1) Discharging the reverse burden 
 
22 Graham v HM Advocate, 2018 SCCR 347; Lilburn v HM Advocate 2015 SCCR 320; Reid 
v HM Advocate 2013 SCCR 70. Although it must be noted that in all three of these appeals, 
the conviction was delivered before the change in law relating to diminished responsibility. 
23 In two of these appeals against sentence diminished responsibility had been accepted and 
the appellant had been sentenced on that basis. In the third appeal against sentence, 
diminished responsibility had been pled unsuccessfully and the appeal concerned the 
punishment part related to the mandatory life sentence for the murder conviction. 
24 In one of the cases where diminished responsibility was rejected, it was nevertheless 
accepted that the accused did not intend to kill. On this basis a guilty plea was accepted to 
culpable homicide. See Sentencing statement for HM Advocate v Mark Foster. 
25 Scottish Government, Criminal Proceedings in Scotland, 2018-19 (2020), as calculated 
from table 4a. 
Section 51B (4) states that “It is for the person charged with murder to establish, on the 
balance of probabilities, that the condition set out in subsection (1) is satisfied”. This reverse 
burden exists due to the plea being based on a claim about the internal mental condition of 
the accused - a fact which would be objectively difficult for the Crown to prove, particularly 
given that they cannot compel an accused to give evidence or be examined on the issue of 
their mental health.26  
Although section 51B does not place a statutory requirement on the defence to provide 
expert evidence in support of their claim, given the operation of the reverse burden, reference 
to expert testimony is likely. Certainly, in England and Wales it has been established that 
medical evidence is a practical necessity because of the reverse burden which exists.27 The 
Scottish appeal court has reserved its opinion on this point.28 
The admission of expert evidence in Scottish criminal trials is now governed by the 
Supreme Court decision in Kennedy29. The four-part test holds that skilled witnesses can give 
evidence of their opinions to assist the court as long as:  
1. Expert evidence is necessary to assist the court  
2. The expert has the necessary knowledge and experience  
3. The expert’s presentation and assessment of evidence is impartial 
4. Their discipline is underpinned by a reliable and established body of knowledge 
Historically, the admission of expert evidence was a feature of diminished responsibility 
which led to judicial scepticism of the plea itself: it was feared that it would potentially 
require the admission of expert evidence as a matter of common practice and that such 
experts would usurp the function of the court.30 Certainly, previous appeals have been based 
on experts commenting on whether the accused was acting with diminished responsibility31 
(that is to say, commenting on the ultimate issue before the court). Kennedy has made clear 
that an expert may address the ultimate issue before the court32, but it remains the case that 
 
26 Lilburn v HM Advocate 2011 SLT 861. 
27 R v Bunch [2013] EWCA Crim 2498. 
28 Graham v HM Advocate 2018 SCCR 347. 
29 Kennedy v Cordia Services LLP [2016] UKSC 6 
30 Carraher v HM Advocate 1946 JC 108. 
31 See Martindale v HM Advocate 1994 SLT1093 where it is commented that “(1) there was 
evidence from the defence psychiatrist Dr Ritson that the appellant was suffering from 
diminished responsibility at the time of the incident, that he was not in his right mind and that 
he was in a state of mind bordering on mental disease”. 
32 Kennedy v Cordia Services LLP [2016] UKSC 6 at para 50. Chalmers and Leverick also 
exemplify the fact that an expert can effectively address the ultimate issue before the court by 
the expert must not do this by reference to the standard of proof33. Whilst judicial attitudes 
towards expert evidence have evolved, with expert testimony now being admitted across a 
wide range of cases (not just those which involve a plea of diminished responsibility34), there 
continues to exist reservation about the admission of expert opinion on new and developing 
sciences.35  
Post codification, the role of the expert in diminished responsibility cases has been 
considered by the appeal court.36 In Graham, the court considered whether a psychologist 
meets the necessary qualification required of an expert witness when being asked to consider 
how drugs and alcohol may have interacted with mental disorder. The court suggested that in 
such circumstances, evidence could not be provided by a psychologist on this matter but 
would have to be provided by someone medically trained, such as a psychiatrist (but invited 
the Scottish Law Commission to give further consideration to the qualifications which should 
be demanded by the court in murder trials as part of their ongoing review of homicide.)37 For 
commentators such as Hallett, an increased reliance on psychiatric evidence in diminished 
responsibility cases would be problematic. For him, psychiatric evidence has already been 
given too much authority, leading to an obfuscation of how moral responsibility is assigned 
in diminished responsibility cases.38  
In terms of assessing whether a reverse burden has been discharged, warning has 
previously been given in civil cases against using arithmetical approaches of assessment:  
The court arrives at its conclusion by considering whether on an overall assessment of 
the evidence (i.e. on a preponderance of the evidence) the case for believing that the 
suggested event happened is more compelling than the case for not reaching that 
 
adopting the language of the courts without using the language of ‘diminished responsibility’. 
In the unreported case of HM Advocate v Gorrie (Alison), the psychiatrist giving evidence 
had adopted the language used by Lord Roger in Galbraith, J Chalmers and F Leverick (n 2) 
para 11-16 footnote 27. 
33 Hendry v HM Advocate 1987 JC 63. 
34 For a discussion of the development of psychological evidence into law see F E Raitt and S 
M Zeedyk, The implicit relation of psychology and law: Women and syndrome evidence 
(London: Routledge, 2000) ch 2 esp. 
35 See for example Young v HM Advocate 2014 SCCR 649. 
36 Graham v HM Advocate 2018 SCCR 347 at para 114. 
37 Ibid at para 124. The Scottish Law Commission is considering the qualifications of experts 
in diminished responsibility cases as part of their current review. 
38 N Hallett, “Psychiatric Evidence in Diminished Responsibility” (2018) 82(6) Journal of 
Criminal Law 442. 
belief (which is not necessarily the same as believing positively that it did not happen) 
and not by reference to percentage possibilities or probabilities.39 
This warning was referred to in Rodgers when discussing how the balance of probabilities 
should be understood. 
(2) Defining the standard of proof 
The question of how the standard of balance of probabilities should be understood is one 
which has been raised before.40 Post codification, the Scottish appeal court has been faced 
with this question explicitly in the context of diminished responsibility41. In Rodgers, it was 
noted that in the original trial, the judge referred to a mathematical account which had earlier 
been provided by defence counsel: 
All that it means in practical terms is that something is more probable than not, I think 
[defence counsel] put it into percentage terms, something is more likely than not if it’s 
51% playing 49%. It could be 70 playing 30 or 90 playing 10 but a minimum, it has to 
be more likely than not which is 51% playing 49%, that’s as colloquially as I can put 
the matter. So it’s more likely than not, and that is the burden of proof that the 
defence bear in this trial.42 
The court concluded that no material misdirection existed in relation to the direction which 
had been provided. In support of this conclusion, it was recognised that the concept has 
historically been expressed similarly in both legal practice and Scottish academic 
commentary.43 However, the dangers of adopting this approach were recognised. 
In conclusion, post codification, diminished responsibility has remained static in terms of 
how the concept of the balance of probabilities is conveyed to jurors and has narrowed in 
respects of the role of expert evidence: where the mental condition in question co-exists with 
drugs and alcohol, expert evidence offered must be provided by a psychiatrist. This is 
especially significant given the overlap between intoxication and mental conditions. This was 
a key issue in three of the seven appeal cases examined (including Graham) and twelve of the 
29 unreported cases examined (41.4%).  
 
39 re A (Children) (Care Proceedings: Burden of Proof) [2018] 4 WLR 117 at para 58. 
40 See for example Lord Nicholls’s comments in re(H) Minors [1996] AC 563. 
41 Rodgers v HM Advocate 2019 SCCR. 230. 
42 Ibid at para 22. 
43  On this point the court referred to F Davidson, Evidence (2007) para 4.84, citing Davies v 
Taylor [1974] AC 207, Lord Simon at 219-220. 
 
E. WHERE MENTAL ABNORMALITY COEXISTS                                
WITH VOLUTARY INTOXICATION  
 
(1) Clarifying the rule 
Galbraith did not go beyond stating the rule in relation to the role of drugs and alcohol44 and 
did not refer to unreported case law which had.45 As such, the clarification on this point was 
viewed as a significant basis to justify the introduction of a statutory definition.46 Section 51B 
(3) states that: 
The fact that a person was under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other 
substance at the time of the conduct in question does not of itself—(a)constitute 
abnormality of mind for the purposes of subsection (1), or (b)prevent such 
abnormality from being established for those purposes. 
Therefore, although voluntary drug and/or alcohol intoxication cannot form the basis of the 
defence itself, the influence of drugs and alcohol will not rule out diminished responsibility 
per se.  Section 51B provided scope for diminished responsibility to develop an appreciation 
of the complex interplay between mental abnormality and voluntary intoxication - something 
which had not been achieved under common law: 
discussion of the effects of intoxication combined with another abnormality of mind 
assumes that the two are separable in some way. In many cases, however, the two 
may be linked, in that the abnormality of mind may be causally linked to the 
intoxication.47 
(2) A narrow approach post codification 
Post codification, the application of section 51B (3) was considered in detail in Rodgers.48 
This case involved the unprovoked killing of a young female at a party, witnessed by others. 
The accused suffered from long standing psychiatric problems, associated with a 
 
44 Galbraith v HM Advocate (No.2) 2002 JC 1 at para 54. 
45 HM Advocate v McLeod, unreported, as discussed by J Chalmers and F Leverick (n 2) at 
para 11-13. 
46 Scottish Law Commission (n 13). 
47 J Chalmers and F Leverick (n 2) at para 11-14. 
48 Rodgers v HM Advocate 2019 SCCR 230. 
“challenging childhood”49 and had attempted suicide on more than one occasion. On the night 
of the offence, he had been witnessed expressing suicidal ideation. At the time of the offence, 
the accused was taking prescribed medication (the anticonvulsant and mood stabiliser, 
‘lamotrigine’, and the benzodiazepine, ‘Valium’) but had refused counselling and psychiatric 
services and continued to consume large quantities of alcohol, contrary to medical advice.50 
Evidence was led at trial which suggested that, at the time of the offence, the accused 
was suffering from a mental disorder as well as being under the influence of alcohol and 
drugs. Forensic psychiatrist, Dr Isobel Campbell, concluded that the appellant was suffering 
from Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder (EUPD), marked by a tendency towards 
impulsivity and lack of consideration for consequences, as well as Borderline Personality 
Disorder.51 She noted in evidence that the contribution of drugs and alcohol in combination 
with these disorders would be “unhelpful”.52 Crown psychiatrist, Dr Racheal Sibbett, 
similarly concluded that the appellant was suffering from EUPD and noted the likely 
contribution of intoxication in the alleged offence.53 
The appeal against conviction specifically considered how the jury should be directed 
where evidence of both mental abnormality and intoxication exists. It was submitted that the 
trial judge had erred in directing the jury that it was open to them to find either that the 
substantial cause of the appellant’s actions was the abnormality of mind or that it was his use 
of alcohol or drugs at that time. In its judgement, the court emphasised that the key issue for 
consideration is whether, despite the intoxication, the accused was suffering from an 
abnormality of mind which substantially impaired the ability to control conduct; abnormality 
need not be the only cause of impairment in order for diminished responsibility to operate, 
but it must be substantial. In considering the application of section 51B, the court noted the 
continued relevance of the common law principles of diminished responsibility, referring to 
Brennan54 and the fact that the impairment in question “must not be brought on by the 
voluntary ingestion of drink or drugs.”55 
 
49 Ibid at para 4. 
50 bid. 
51 bid at para 17. 
52 bid at para 18. 
53 bid at para 20. 
54 Brennan v HM Advocate, 1977 J C 38. 
55 Rodgers v HM Advocate 2019 SCCR 230 at para 32. 
The court concluded that the judicial direction which had been offered on this point at 
the original trial was erroneous.56 However, although this was considered a material error - 
given the centrality of the issue - it could not be concluded that it had given rise to a 
miscarriage of justice since evidence had been led which pointed to the effect of combining 
Valium and alcohol (“paradoxical aggression” and a disinhibition of aggression):57 
Even on the assumption that the appellant’s ability was impaired as a consequence of 
a combined effect of voluntary alcohol/drug ingestion and a mental abnormality, the 
correct verdict was one of murder.58 
In the unreported case of Kmieciak, Lord Burns appears to have adopted a similar 
understanding, whilst also recognising the role that intoxication had on the offender’s 
behaviour. Although the plea was accepted in that case, it was commented: 
You appear to be someone who is vulnerable to psychotic disturbance when you have 
taken illegal substances but having regard to the plea it was accepted on the basis that 
the abnormality at the time was caused by natural circumstances and not drug 
intake.59 
(3) Tensions and contradictions 
Yet, in other unreported cases identified, where guilty pleas to culpable homicide on the basis 
of diminished responsibility were accepted by the Crown, a different approach appears to 
have been taken. In Loughton, Lord Beckett offers insight into this decision when relaying 
comments provided by a forensic psychiatrist: 
He explains that there is a complex interplay of problems associated with your 
personality disorder and substance use which has been responsible for violence in the 
past and these factors continue to be the main risk factors for future violence.60 
 
56 Ibid at para 33. 
57 Ibid at para 35. 
58 Ibid at para 36. 
59 The Courier, “Man who stabbed friend to death in Perth after “hearing voices” jailed for 





60 Sentencing Statement HM Advocate v Steven Loughton, 2020, available at 
https://www.judiciary.scot/home/sentences-judgments/sentences-and-
opinions/2020/04/24/hma-v-steven-loughton  
A similarly approach is also evident in Little:  
[the accused] had been under the influence of Amphetamine, which had exacerbated 
his personality disorder and was deemed to have caused “diminished responsibility”.61 
Further analysis of unreported cases suggests that diminished responsibility is not always 
applied or accepted in relevant circumstances. For example, in one case it was accepted that 
the accused’s actions had arisen out of unforeseen side effects of prescribed drugs62 – a 
position better represented by the full (but rarely advanced) defence of automatism. 
Unforeseen side effects of medication also formed part of the submission made in a second 
case where diminished responsibility was not accepted.63 One explanation for this difference 
could be that a gendered application of the plea exists in practice: four of the 29 unreported 
cases involved a female accused and in all four cases diminished responsibility was accepted 
- even where the relevance of the plea was questionable. In one, a female accused was found 
guilty of culpable homicide by way of diminished responsibility arising from the “strain” that 
allegations of sexual abuse against her husband (the deceased) had placed her under.64 No 
further mention is made about any specific mental abnormality being experienced by the 
accused at the time of the killing. Similarly, in another unreported case involving a female 
accused, a woman was convicted of culpable homicide on the basis of diminished 
responsibility following a plea of guilty being accepted by the Crown. Here, reference was 
made only to her alcohol and substance abuse problems.65 This case could be cited as an 
example of the plea operation in circumstances of addiction only (see section F below) but it 
is more likely that these cases are further evidence of the law’s recognised tendency towards 
utilising medical models for female offending.66 Although these four cases represent a very 
small sample and it is difficult to draw clear conclusions from them, the broader context in 
which they are occurring must be recognised. Because women kill less frequently than men, 
 
61Evening Telegraph, “Dundee Killer Charles Little gets q10 years in jail for bow and arrow 
and knife death”, available at https://www.eveningtelegraph.co.uk/fp/breaking-dundee-
crossbow-killer-charles-little-gets-10-years-in-jail-over-death-of-gordon-diduca/  
62 BBC News, “Marlene Torlay admits killing Marie McCracken”, available at 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-22267573.  
63 Dunfermline Press, “Killer’s mental state affected by sex abuse, defence claims”, available 
at https://www.dunfermlinepress.com/news/18003657.killers-mental-state-affected-sex-
abuse-defence-claims/  
64 BBC News, “Wife walks free after killing husband”, available at 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-42621029  
65 BBC News, “Woman Admits brutal killing of neighbour Colin Skilbeck”, available at 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-edinburgh-east-fife-42227195?intlink_from_url=&  
66 F E Raitt and S M Zeedyk (n 39). 
their behaviour is more likely to be viewed as aberrant by society. As a result, two competing 
narratives have tended to prevail: one where femininity is denied due to the violence 
exhibited (the ‘bad’ woman) and one where her criminal responsibility is neutralised (the 
‘mad’ woman).67  
In Graham68, the opposite position was adopted despite the apparent relevance of 
diminished responsibility - again showing tensions between the approach of the appeal court 
and the operation of the plea in practice. The circumstances of the homicide included 
voluntary intoxication as well as a claim to mental abnormality (EUPD and also ‘battered 
person syndrome’ arising from the domestic abuse she had suffered at the hands of the 
partner she killed).69 Specialist registrar, Dr Morris, who had examined the appellant on 
behalf of the Crown was of the view that Graham’s intoxication would “outweigh any 
possible evidence of a mental disorder” and that symptoms which could have been attributed 
to the mental disorder EUPD could also have been explained by the drug and alcohol 
problems experienced by the appellant.70 The second Crown expert, psychiatrist Dr Lenihan, 
was similarly of the view that despite the EUPD diagnosis, the most prominent issue being 
suffered by the appellant was her dependence on drugs and alcohol (which could not form the 




(1) Potentially relevant Scottish cases 
In Graham, the appellant’s long-term drug and alcohol addiction were recognised explicitly 
by the psychiatrists who examined her. Although addiction was not the basis of the 
diminished responsibility plea, it was closely related to the EUPD on which the plea was 
argued. Perhaps due to the fact that this was not the explicit basis of the plea, the court did 
not provide specific direction on the whether the mental abnormality required for diminished 
 
67 D Kirkwood, “Female Perpetrated Homicide in Victoria between 1985 and 1995” (2003) 36 
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responsibility can include addiction.  Graham’s appeal was refused and an unsympathetic 
approach taken towards her addiction. For example, it is noted that the “appellant’s own 
accounts of her alcohol and drug consumption varied”,71 but that the consumption on the day 
of the homicide potentially included prescribed and illegal diazepam, mirtazapene, 
methadone, lager, Bacardi, and amphetamine. Rather miraculously, the accused was deemed 
fit for interview on the same day by the forensic medical examiner – a fact not subject to 
interrogation, given that it was not one of the points of appeal.  
In Rodgers, no explicit reference was made to addiction or dependency although it 
would appear that addiction was present. It is noted that the accused continually mixed 
alcohol with benzodiazepines, despite being warned of the dangers associated with this72, that 
he had consumed a “large” amount of alcohol at the time of the offence73, and in reference to 
a meeting which occurred between the accused and a friend, it is commented that: 
On his arrival, the appellant had…“a bag of alcoholic drinks”….apart from beer and 
gin, the appellant drank “shots”, and “Mickey Finns” (i.e. presumably alcohol laced 
with drugs).74 
In combination, these provide a picture that alcohol was a problem in the accused’s life and 
suggest that this was an individual suffering from alcohol addiction (as well as psychiatric 
problems), even if he did not explicitly identify as alcohol dependent. But since the matter of 
addiction was not put before the court, and was not suggested by medical evidence, it would 
have been difficult for the court to elucidate on this point.  
In other cases, addiction has been explicitly brought to the attention of the court. In 
Young it was recognised that the appellant had a history of alcohol and drug abuse. In her 
appeal against sentence the trial judge commented that, despite this, “it seems unlikely that 
either drink or drugs played a big part in what happened”.75 Reporting elsewhere notes that: 
A toxicology report revealed that blood taken after arrest showed traces of four 
different drugs and Young was later found to be over the drink drive limit. A doctor 
told the court Young was liable to “violent and dangerous outbursts”, was on 14 
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prescription drugs, inhaled solvents daily, drank to excess and had smoked heroin the 
morning before the alleged murder.76 
The trial judge’s view of this conviction for murder was that: 
The jury must have accepted the unanimous evidence of all the psychiatrists that Ms 
Young was suffering from an abnormality of mind, as now defined in section 51(B) of 
the 1995 Act, at the time of the offence.  However, they must also have concluded 
that her conduct was not substantially impaired at the time.77 
At trial, evidence had been provided by six consultant psychiatrists who agreed that the 
accused was suffering from a “severe personality disorder” comprising of “a mixed 
personality disorder with emotionally unstable (borderline) narcistic, histrionic and anti-
social traits”, another psychiatrist diagnosed schizophrenia.78 Upon conviction, a mandatory 
life sentence for murder with a punishment part of 20 years was imposed. One of the 
submissions made on behalf of the appellant in the appeal against this sentence was that 
imprisonment was “a more severe punishment” for her, given her vulnerability. This 
vulnerability arose from her unique background of gender reassignment, personality disorder 
and impulsivity problems.79 This submission was rejected by the court who noted her stable 
condition and ongoing engagement with the healthcare team in Corton Vale Prison.80  
In addition to offering insight into how diminished responsibility has been interpreted 
post codification, these three appeal cases indicate the severity and complexity of mental 
health conditions which non-specialised prison facilities will be faced with at any given time. 
In Scotland, the court has not been asked to consider dependency as the only basis of 
diminished responsibility. In theory, such a plea is not ruled out by the drafting of section 
51B, but it would appear to be very unlikely to succeed in practice given the approach 
adopted in Rodgers and Graham. However, Court of Appeal of England and Wales has 
addressed the issue of dependency in several cases. 
 
(2) The Court of Appeal in England and Wales 
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In Tandy81 it was held that the fact finder would need to be persuaded that no choice existed 
about alcohol consumption before dependency could be included as a mental abnormality for 
the purposes of diminished responsibility. This position was criticised on the basis that 
diminished responsibility would be removed from those who were alcohol dependent.82 
Later case law suggested that alcohol dependency could be considered a psychiatric 
condition in and of itself,83 but in Stewart, it was emphasised that just because a defendant 
suffers from alcohol dependent syndrome does not mean that an abnormality of mind has 
been established.84 The Privy Council have assumed that this position would also apply to 
drug addiction.85 In Daniel, the court held that any abnormality of mind arising from transient 
intoxication was irrelevant but held that an exception may arise where the intake was the 
involuntary result of “irresistible craving or compulsion”.86 The position now being that 
diminished responsibility can include drug and/or alcohol dependency87 and relevant factors 
for consideration are: the seriousness and extent of the alcohol dependence, the ability of the 
defendant to control their alcohol intake, whether the defendant is capable of abstinence and 
whether there existed reason for drinking more than usual.88   
Craigie and Davis are of the view that, despite the fact that the diminished responsibility 
test introduced to England and Wales in 2009 was one which was meant to limit diminished 
responsibility in such a way that alcoholism could not form the basis of the plea, subsequent 
interpretation of the mental incapacity test has resulted in it being a recognised basis on 
which diminished responsibility can be based.89 
 
(3) Medico-legal analysis 
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Such an approach recognises the relationship between addiction and violence. Over thirty 
years ago, psychiatrist and behavioural scientist Swanson evidenced a similar corelation 
between alcohol abuse, mental disorders and violence: 
Regression analyses examining relationships between major mental disorders, alcohol 
abuse, and violent behavior support an overall conclusion that the joint occurrence of any 
two conditions significantly increases the probability that the remaining condition will 
also be present. Interestingly, the absolute risk of any one of these conditions given the 
others is quite variable. For example, among males under age 45 and of lower SES, the 
probability that violent alcohol abusers will be mentally ill is about 15 percent; the 
probability that those with dual diagnoses will be violent is about 30 percent; and the 
probability that the violent mentally ill will be alcohol abusers is about 78 percent.90 
Craigie and Davies estimate that alcohol dependence exists at a rate of around twice the 
prevalence of drug dependency, “making it a serious social problem. It is also a complex 
problem because of the deeply embedded role for alcohol in UK culture”.91 Craigie and 
Davies recognise that perceptions of addiction are shaped by historical contexts and influence 
how society responses to addiction.92 They use their analysis of how mental incapacity tests 
are used in cases involving anorexia as an important point of comparison: anorexia develops 
out of traits valued by society (thinness, exercise, tendencies towards perfectionism); it is 
often not seen to be within the control of the person affected by the illness. This is in contrast 
to alcohol and drug addiction where it is often considered that the individual has a choice 
over their behaviour.   
Problems of addiction are well recognised in Scotland, especially in relation to those 
engaged with the criminal justice system. It is likely that a significant number of accused who 
seek to rely on diminished responsibility in future case will have a history of addiction. Even 
if addiction is not accepted as a sole basis for the diminished responsibility, recognition can 
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The justification for placing diminished responsibility on a statutory footing arose from the 
fact that voluntary intoxication would not remove the accused from availing themselves of 
diminished responsibility. Yet the approach taken towards cases involving intoxication and 
mental abnormality does not seem to have developed from common law. There existed an 
opportunity to recognise the complex interplay between intoxication, mental conditions and 
offending and this has not been realised. Similarly, the appeal court’s position remains static 
on the issue of instruction to jurors on what is meant by the balance of probabilities, despite 
the dangers of the current approach being recognised. Elsewhere, narrowing of the plea has 
been suggested in what type of expert is required when mental abnormality interacts with 
intoxication - something which is likely to have a significant impact on the submission of 
psychological expertise in practice. 
It has been shown that tension exists between the view adopted by appeal court post 
codification and the operation of the plea in practice. On one reading the operation of the plea 
in practice is positive, allowing as it does for a realistic understanding of how mental 
abnormality and intoxication co-exist in practice, but yet, the analysis presented also shows 
that there may be a gendered application of the plea. There exists a danger that female 
accused are being afforded leniency in terms of what conditions will satisfy the plea. Whilst 
diminished responsibility must be accessible to those who need it most, there must also be 
recognition of the historical tendency towards medicalising female offenders within the 
criminal justice system and the dangers this imposes for women’s access to justice more 
generally. 
As would be expected in a small jurisdiction, the appeal court has not been asked to 
consider a larger number of cases following the codification of diminished responsibility. It is 
recognised that judicial interpretation of section 51B may develop further as a wider variety 
of cases are appealed. However, if Scotland wishes to have mental health laws which 
adequately reflect the lived experiences of those who offend, the relationship between 
intoxication and mental abnormality must be engaged with in a meaningful manner within the 
doctrine of diminished responsibility. Lack of access to the plea not only risks injustice in 
terms of the resulting conviction, but also the treatment which might be afforded to the 
offender in question. 
 
 
 
 
